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VI.
RIGHTS IN PERSONAM.
General Provisions.-Whether the subject of an obligation should
be capable of being estimated in money is a moot question. The
French Code seems to have been based on the theory that it should
be capable of being so estimated. The Japanese Code of 189o was
also based on the same doctrine and many European systems of
jurisprudence adhere to the same principle. The present Japanese
Code makes a new departure and provides in Article 399, that the
subject of an obligation may be something not capable of being
estimated in money. One of the reasons for maintaining that the
subject of an obligation should be capable of appraisement in money
is that, taking the contrary view, there would be a confusion of legal
ideas with moral and social obligations. When the conceptions of
moral and social obligations are so far advanced as to become com-
mon and general, they are taken up by legislators and codrdinated
with legal obligations. It is impossible to draw a scientific line of
demarcation between legal obligations on the one hand and moral or
social obligations on the other, by inquiring whether the subject
thereof can be estimated in money or not. The advance of civiliza-
tion has necessitated the recognition of obligations the subject of
which can not be reduced to a monetary equivalent, and that necessity
increases with the progress of time. The rights and duties arising
out of family relationship, for instance, have certainly no money
value, or perhaps it is more accurate to say that they can not be
expressed in dollars and cents. The Japanese rule on this subject,
placed as it is, in the General Provisions is applicable to all rights
in personam, whether they spring from contract or any other facts
or conditions recognized by law.
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The effect of an obligation.-When a party to an obligation fails
to perform or to accept performance of the obligation in time, he is
said to be in inora, to use the expression of the Roman law, and
heavier duties are imposed upon parties in that condition. The
Japanese Code provides, in this connection, that if a certain time is
designated for the performance of the obligation, the debtor is in
nmora from such time; if a time which is uncertain has been desig-
nated for the performance of the obligation, the debtor is in nZora
after he has notice that such time has arrived; that if no time has
been designated for the performance of the obligation, the debtor is
in inora after a demand for performance has been made upon
him (Article 412). Thus, according to the Japanese Code in the
first case, the mere arrival of time places the debtor in mora, without
any action on the part of the creditor. The French law on the other
hand makes an express agreement on the subject between the parties
necessary. The Japanese law, like the German, has recognized the
principle that time itself is notice to the debtor. According to the
French Code the creditor is never placed in mora, but the Japanese
Code provides that if the creditor refuses to accept the performance
of the obligation, he is in mora from the time a tender of per-
formance is made to him. No explanation is required why a creditor
who refuses to accept the performance of an obligation should be
placed in the same category with a debtor who neglects to perform
it. The offer of performance does not extinguish the obligation,
but the creditor who refuses to accept performance is answerable
for any damages occasioned thereby to the debtor.
Where the nature of an obligation is such as not to admit of com-
pulsory performance, no demand for specific performance can be
made. The French and Japanese Codes on this point are identical,
but the reasons for the rule are different. The framers and
expounders of the French Code say that if a demand for specific
performance should be allowed on such cases, it would restrain the
personal liberty of the debtor. Hence the vording of the French
law runs: "All obligations to do or not to do resolve themselves in
damages, in case of non-execution on the part of the obligee."
This, however, is hardly logical, for all obligations, in so far as they
constitute the rights of the creditor, are restraints on the freedom
of the debtor. The view taken by the framers of the Japanese Code
was that the creditor, on the one hand, is entitled to the benefit of
full performance of the obligation so far as such performance is
possible and that the debtor, on the other hand, rests under the
correlative duty to make, to the same extent, a like full performance
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of the same according to the original intentions. Accordingly, the
provisions of the Japanese Code on the subject are as follows: "If
the debtor fails to perform his obligation voluntarily, the creditor
may apply to the court for compulsory performance, except where
the nature of the obligation does not admit of it. If the sub-
ject of the obligation is the doing of an act, the creditor may
apply to the court to have it done by a third person at the debtor's
expense; but if the subject of the obligation is the doing of a legal
act, the decree of the court stands in the place of an expression of
intention by the debtor. As to an obligation whose subject is the
forbearance from an act, the creditor may apply to the court to have
such acts as have been done undone, and proper measures taken for
the future. These provisions do not affect the right to claim
damages."
The clear intention of the law is that the creditor shall be pro-
tected to the fullest extent, and as nearly as possible according to
the original intention of the parties. The provision allowing an
application to the court to have the obligation performed by a third
person at the expense of the debtor is a new conception, which finds
its first expression, it is believed, in the Japanese Code.
Joint Obligations.-Joint obligations, or obligations solidaires,
are, in the French Code, divided into "solidaritg" between the credi-
tors, and "solidariti" on the part of the debtors. The latter corre-
sponds to joint and several liability. When each one of the several
creditors can demand the performance of an obligation and the
performance made to one of them frees the debtor as against all,
even where the benefit thereof is capable of division, the obligation
is said to be solidaire between all creditors. It is at the choice of
the debtor to make performance to any of the creditors, unless he is
prevented from doing so by the prosecution of one or more other
creditors. These provisions are entirely omitted from the Japanese
Code, not because they are considered harmful, nor with an intention
of prohibiting the creation of such an obligation, but because as a
matter of practice there is little occasion for it, and in case such an
occasion should arise, it can be met by other methods recognized by
law. Concerning joint obligations in respect of debtors, the Japanese
Code provides that where several persons are liable for a joint
obligation, the creditor may demand performance of the whole
obligation, or only a part of it, either from one of the debtors, or at
the same time or successively from all the debtors; that the existence
of a reason for the invalidity or rescission of a legal act as to one
of the j6int debtors, does not impair the validity of the obligation
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as to the other debtors; that a demand for performance made to
one joint debtor has effect against all the debtors, and that if a
novation is effected between one of the joint debtors and the creditor,
the latter's claim is extinguished as to all the joint debtors. Neither
in the French nor the Japanese Code are joint obligations ever
presumed. They can only be brought into existence in virtue of
express provisions contained in the act creating the obligations
(Japanese Code, Article 427; French Code, Articles -1197, 1202).
In case one of the joint debtors having a claim against the credi-
tor, establishes a set-off, the creditor's claim is extinguished for the
benefit of all. Respecting the question whether the other joint
debtors ought to be allowed to raise the plea of set-off when the
joint debtor having the claim does not do so, the Japanese Code
provides that such plea may be so raised in so far as such debtor's
share of the joint obligation is concerned. The French law expressly
prohibits such a plea. Article 1294 is explicit on the subject. It
declares that a joint debtor can not plead as a set-off that which the
creditor owes to his co-debtor. The German law on the subject is
the same (Article 422). Theoretically speaking, the Japanese law
is opposed to the principle that in the case of a joint obligation, each
debtor is liable for the performance of the whole obligation and
that the plea of set-off can only be raised by the debtor who has a
claim against the creditor. But on the practical grounds of con-
venience there are reasons for preferring the Japanese rule. To say
that a joint debtor is liable for the performance of the whole obliga-
tion only determines his relation to the creditor. As between the
debtors it is enough if he performs his share of the obligation, and
when he performs the obligation beyond his share, to that extent he
performs an obligation belonging to another, for which the right to
demand contribution exists. Now under the French law, if the
demand for performance be made by the creditor upon a joint
debtor having no claim to plead in set-off, the latter would have to
perform the whole obligation and look to his co-debtor for his share
of the obligation, while such co-debtor would in turn have his
remedy against the creditor in the form of an independent claim.
If in such cases the obligations were not voluntarily performed,
there would result according to the French rule, three sets of
action, while by the Japanese law the multiplicity of litigation is
avoided.
In case a joint debtor has obtained from the creditor release
from the joint lability, and one or more of the remaining joint
debtors have not the means to perform, the question arises who is
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to bear the portion which the insolvent debtor is bound to pay. On
this point the French law provides (Article 1215), that the portion
of the obligation which would have been borne by the insolvent
debtor is to be contributed by the solvent debtors and the debtor
who has been released. The Japanese Code, on the other hand,
declares in Article 445, that if a joint debtor has obtained release
from the joint liability, and one of the remaining joint debtors is
without sufficient means to repay his share of the obligation, the
creditor bears the share which the debtor who has been released
from liability would have borne, in respect of that portion of the
joint Dbligation which the insolvent debtor is unable to pay. It is
plain that the responsibility of other joint debtors can not be increased
by any transaction between one joint debtor and the creditor; hence
the portion of the obligation of the insolvent debtor ought not to be
charged to the remaining debtors. It is also clear that the creditor,
in giving release to a jpint debtor, intended to discharge him from
all liability in respect of the obligation. If such a debtor should be
required to contribute his share after his release, even in case there
were insolvent debtors, the effect of the release would not be com-
plete. By making the creditor bear the burden, the rights of the
remaining debtors are not infringed, and the debtor who has obtained
release is entirely freed from obligation, and the creditor has no
grounds for complaint, because it was he who granted the release.
Suretyship.-Suretyship is a contract by which a person binds
himself to perform an obligation in case the principal debtor does
not perform it. The obligation is usually created at the same time
as the principal obligation and with the knowledge and consent of
the principal debtor. But it may be created at a different time and
without the knowledge or consent of the principal debtor. It being
an accessory contract to secure the performance of the principal
obligation it naturally follows the condition of the principal obliga-
tion, if for any reason such principal obligation is at any time
extinguished. In certain cases, however, it was thought necessary
to make exceptions. Article 2012 of the French Code states as a
general rule that suretyship can only be made upon a valid obligation,
and in the second clause of the same article, it is provided that where
an obligation may be invalidated for reasons purely personal to the
debtor, such an obligation may form the subject of the contract of
suretyship and there is given as an example the obligations entered
into by minors. If, therefore, a minor on reaching majority, cancels
an obligation entered into during minority, the contract of suretyship
remains in force. In such cases, the French jurists hold that
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although there is no legal obligation to be secured by suretyship, yet
there is a moral or natural obligation of the minor. The Japanese
law bearing on the subject is stated as follows: "If a surety guaran-
tees an obligation which may be rescinded on the ground of legal
incapacity, knowing of the existence of such incapacity at the tinfe
he agreed to guarantee the obligation, he is presumed in the event
of its non-performance or rescission to have entered into an inde-
pendent and identical obligation." It will be observed that a person,
who with knowledge of the existence of grounds for rescission
guarantees an undertaking of a minor, is considered to have incurred
two different sets of obligations, one strictly and purely an obliga-
tion of suretyship which lapses with the extinction of the principal
obligation, and the other an independent obligation on condition
precedent which comes into force with the rescission or non-perform-
ance of the principal obligation.
Assignment of rights in personam.-According to Anglo-Ameri-
can jurisprudence rights in personam are not, as a general rule,
assignable. These rights are mostly created by contract. They are
the result of the exercise of free-will and bind the parties and ought
to bind the parties only. If assignment is allowed to the creditor
as a right the debtor might be obliged to perform his obligation to a
different and unknown creditor. The debtor might have had a claim
to set-off as against the former creditor, which he would not be able
to set up against the new creditor. Therefore, if the interest of the
debtors is alone consulted, it will be better not to allow the assign-
ment of rights inpersonam. But the demands of modern civilization,
accompanied by the development of credit has required and made it
expedient to relax the rule and even by Anglo-American jurisprud-
ence certain rights in personam have, for a long time, been assign-
able without the special consent of the debtor. The Japanese Code,
in consonance with the principle recognized in the systems of con-
tinental Europe, has adopted the doctrine, that as a general rule,
rights in personam are assignable. Article 466 provides that rights
in personam may be assigned, provided always that they are of a
nature which admits of assignment. Obligations that consist in
the payment of money are of such nature that they can be performed
by any person, and in these cases the rights are assignable under
the Japanese law, but rights which arise out of personal relations,
such as parents and children, are not assignable. The second clause
of the same article declares that the provisions of the preceding
clause do not apply if the parties have expressed a contrary inten-
tion, but that such expression of intention can not be set up against
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a third person acting in good faith. If, therefore, the debtor desires
to protect himself against the possibility of being obliged to perform
his obligation to a new or strange creditor, he has only to express
such an intention in the instrument creating the obligation. The
assignment of the obligation being accompanied by the delivery of
the instrument to the new creditor, the latter would not be able to
plead ignorance. A further protection for the debtor is found in
Article 467, where it is provided that the assignment of a right in
personam in which the creditor is specified by name can not be set
up against the debtor, or a third person, unless the assignor has
notified the debtor of the assignment, or the latter has given his
consent thereto. Upon this point, according to the French law, the
notice to the debtor may be given either by the assignor or the
assignee, but as against persons other than the debtor, the notice
must be given by the assignee (Articles i69o, i69i). This pro-
vision is open to criticism for under it, it is possible for a person to
whom an assignment has not really been made, to pretend the con-
trary, and thus to practice a fraud on the debtor or other third
persons. Certainty would be secured if the law should provide that
the notice must be given jointly by the assignor and assignee, but
that would be at the cost of delay. Hence the Japanese Code, as
well as the German Code, simply provides that it is sufficient if the
notice of the assignment is given by assignor only.
Performance.-Consistently with the principle adopted in respect
of the assignment of rights in personam, the Japanese Code enacts
that performance of an obligation may be made by any third person,
unless its nature does not admit of it, or the parties concerned have
expressed a contrary intention. It is further enacted that a person
who has no interest in the performance, can not make performance
against the will of the debtor (Article 474).
.Article 48o provides that a person who produces a receipt is
deemed to have authority to receive performance. No similar pro-
vision is found in the French Code or in any of the codes promul-
gated previous to the Japanese Code. It is not, however, a new
departure in Japan. It is in accord with the custom which formerly
obtained and the Code has simply made it a legal presumption. It
is to be recommended for the reason that it simplifies the manner of
performance. The German Code has also adopted the same rule
(Article 370).
As to the place where the performance is to be made in absence
of express contract,-whether at the domicile of the creditor or that
of the debtor, or the domicile of the debtor at the time the obligation
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was created, laws of various countries differ. The French law pro-
vides (Article 1247), that where the obligation consists in the
delivery of specified goods the performance is to be made at the
place where the goods were at the time the obligation was created,
and in all other cases, at the place of the domicile of the debtor.
Where the delivery of a specific thing is the object of an obligation,
the Japanese law on the subject follows the French law, but in all
other cases the domicile of the creditor is declared to be the place of
performance (Article 484). Such was the law in Japan before the
Code was adopted, and we saw no necessity for altering it. The
provisions of the German law on the subject are the same as the
French (German Code, Articles 269, 270). There is room for doubt
whether a person making performance may require as a right, a
'eceipt or the surrender of documents evidencing the obligation
where there are such documents. There is no provision on the sub-
ject in the French Code. The Japanese (Articles 486, 487) and
German (Articles 368, 371) Codes contain provisions expressly
giving the person making performance of an obligation the right to
require a receipt or the surrender of the documents as the case
may be.
In certain cases a debtor may be released from his liability by
depositing the object of the obligation. The French Code confines
it to the case where the creditor refuses to accept performance
(Article 1257). The Japanese Code adds two more cases: first,
where the creditor is unable to accept performance, and second,
where the person performing, without fault on his part, can not
ascertain who is the creditor. It is possible that the creditor may
not be able to receive performance by reason of illness or absence
when the obligation becomes due; or his rights may be attached by
his creditors and thus he would be unable to receive performance.
It is also possible that several creditors may contend for the per-
formance of the same obligation, or the right might be assigned,
and thus the debtor would be unable to determine to what person the
obligation should be performed. In these cases it is just that the
debtor should be allowed to exempt himself from further liability by
depositing the thing forming the subject of the obligation. If, how-
ever, the thing forming the subject of performance is not suitable
for deposit, or if it is perishable or liable to injury, or if the keeping
would be unreasonably expensive, it is provided that the person
performing may, with the permission of the court, sell it at auction
and deposit the proceeds (Article 497).
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In certain cases a person who performs on behalf of a debtor is
subrogated to the right of the creditor, that is, he takes the place
of the creditor vis-a-vis the debtor. The Japanese Code provides
that the consent of the creditor at the time of performance is essential
to subrogation, and also that a person who has a rightful interest in
the performance of an obligation is subrogated by operation of
law (Articles 499, 500). One of the debtors of an indivisible or a
joint obligation, or the purchaser of an object which has been pledged
or mortgaged, etc., would come under this provision. The French
Code separates subrogation into legal and conventional, and in respect
of the latter, it provides that subrogation may take place by the
consent of the debtor. This hardly seems just, for by subrogation,
the person performing on behalf of the debtor steps into the position
of the creditor and exercises whatever rights the creditor might have
had against the debtor. It would, therefore, appear to be more
reasonable to require that the creditor's rather than the debtor's con-
sent should be obtained.
Set-off.-Where parties have incurred toward each other obliga-
tions of the same kind, set-off has in various systems of jurispru-
dence been recognized as a proper means of discharging the reciprocal
obligations. In some countries set-off can only be pleaded in defense
to an action. In others the discharge of an obligation is effected by
operation of law when the conditions necessary to the set-off are
fulfilled even without the knowledge of the parties. The French
Code has adopted this latter principle (Article 1290). The Japanese
Code provides that a set-off takes place by means of an expression
of intention made by one party to the other (Article 5o6). Set-off
is a right given to a person, under certain circumstances, as a mode
of discharging his obligation. As it is a right, it does not require
the consent of the other party. But to provide, as does the French
law, that it takes place merely by operation of law even without the
knowledge of the parties, would be an undue interference with the
private affairs of individuals; while to say, that it can only be pleaded
in defense, unnecessarily limits the usefulness of this simple method
of discharging an obligation. The Japanese Code pays due defer-
ence to the will of the parties by making set-off dependent upon an
expression of intention, not confining it to a plea in defense to an
action. This is in harmony with the latest legislative precedents as
shown by the Saxon and Swiss Codes.
Contracts.-In the 'French law the term "Contract" is only
applied to an agreement by which rights in personam are created.
Agreements by which rights in personam are transferred, altered or
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extinguished, or by which rights in rent are created, etc., are styled
"Conventions." There seems to be no reason or necessity for the
distinctions. In the Japanese Code the term "Keiyaku," or contract,
is employed to denote any agreement whose object is to produce a
legal effect within the province of private, as opposed to public, law.
Hence it includes all agreements by which rights in ren as well as
rights in personam are created, altered, transferred or extinguished.
The French law considers the existence of a "cause" as an
essential element in the formation of a contract (Articles 1130, 1131).
But the "cause" of the French law is not the same as the "considera-
tion, ' which is an essential element in forming a valid contract in
contemplation of Anglo-American jurisprudence. What a con-
sideration ought to be is very clearly settled in the latter; but to
ascertain what a "cause" should be in the French law is a more
difficult task. Besides in practice, no importance seems to be
attached to the question of the "cause." This is probably due to
the provision of Article 1132, where it is declared that a contract is
none the less valid, even though the cause is not expressed.
The Japanese Code has dispensed with these legal requirements
and nothing like the rules which obtain in America and England con-
cerning the consideration of a contract, or in France respecting
"cause," are found in it. It is difficult to conceive why the expres-
sion or the want of expression of an acknowledgment of the receipt
of a nominal sum of money, for instance, should be considered so
important as to make the validity of an obligation dependent upon
such expression.
Advertisements.-In Article 529 and the three subsequent articles
of the Japanese Code are laid down the rules to be applied in cases
where proposals are made by advertisements. It is provided that a
person who advertises that he will give a fixed remuneration to who-
ever performs a certain act, is bound to give such remuneration to
any person who performs the act. The advertiser is permitted to
cancel the advertisement so long as the act specified is not completed,
following in this respect the same means that were used for adver-
tising. Explicit rules for application in cases where there are several
persons who perform the act in question are also laid down. At the
time the French Code was elaborated, the organs for appealing to
the public were not developed as they have been in recent years, and
of course no provisions of this kind were then found necessary.
But having in view the peculiar circumstances attendant upon pro-
posals made in this manner and the frequency of cases in which this
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mode is resorted to, it was found necessary that special provisions
on the subject should be introduced into the Code.
Effect of a Contract.-When a specified thing is the subject-
matter of a bilateral contract, if the thing is damaged or lost from a
cause not attributable to the debtor the question arises, upon whom
are to fall the consequences. Is the debtor to bear the damage or
loss? Is he bound to refund the purchase money if already paid,
or if not paid, is he deprived of the right to demand payment? It
would seem at first sight that since the delivery of the specified thing
and the payment of money are originally so closely related to each
other, the impossibility of delivery should release the creditor
from the obligation of making payment. But this is an erroneous
conception; for when a bilateral contract is once concluded it is
resolvable into two sets of obligations. In the example given, one
of the parties Would be bound to make the delivery of the specified
thing, while the other would be bound to make payment and the
duty of each may be considered as an independent obligation, and
there is no reason why the debtor should suffer loss occasioned by
causes for which he is not responsible. The question may also be
considered from another point of view. As soon as the contract is
made in a case like the one above referred t% the ownership of
the specified thing is transferred from one party to the other, and
therefore, if it is damaged or lost, the injury should fall on the
owner. Conversely, if the price of the thing should rise after the
conclusion of the contract, the party who is bound to make delivery
would not be entitled to demand on that account the payment of any
more money than was called for by the original contract. The profit
-would accrue to the other party. This is the view taken by both the
French and Japanese Codes, although the German Code has adopted
the contrary principle and makes the debtor bear the consequences
of the loss or injury.
The French Code lays down the general rule that a person can
only bind himself in his own name and for his own benefit (Article
iiig), and that the effect of a contract is limited to the parties to
the contract (Article 1165). This is the natural result of the
principle-that the object of an obligation must be capable of being
estimated in money, that is, an obligation must -result in a benefit
to the creditor. Consequently where an agreement is so made as to
confer a benefit on a third person, not a party to the contract, such
an agreement would not create an obligation under the French law.
The requirements of modern society demand the recognition of the
contrary principle; namely, that an agreement entered into for the
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benefit of a third person should be enforceable. The contract of life-
insurance is a very good illustration. The contract is entered into
between the insurance company and a living person, but the obliga-
tion Ion the part of the insurer is to be performed to a third person
upon the death of the insured. The Japanese Code provides that if
a party to a contract has agreed to make a prestation to a third
person, the latter has the right to claim such prestation directly from
the former, and that in such case the right of the third person comes
into existence at the time when he expresses to the debtor his inten-
tion to take the benefit of the contract. The German Code goes
still further, and provides that the obligation is at once created
between the debtor and the third person ivithout any expression of
intention on the part of the third party to take the benefit of the
contract. Even a benefit can not be forced on another, and therefore
the German Code provides further that in case the third person
expresses an intention that he does not desire to take the benefit of
the contract, then the obligation is deemed not to have been created
ab initio.
Rescission of a Contract.-With respect to the mode of rescind-
ing a contract the Japanese Code provides that if by virtue of the
contract itself, or of a provision of law, one of the part'es has the
right to rescind it, this is effected by means of an expression of
intention made to the other party (Article 540)-. The French Code,
on the othehand, enacts that rescission must be made by amapplica-
tion to the court (Article 11345. A legal proceeding always means
a certain amount of delay and expense. The Japafiese has adopted
the-simpler method.
Bcth the French and German Codes make donation a formal
contract, that is, to say, it must be evidenced by certain documents
prescribed by law. The reason usually assigned is the necessity to
prevent persons from hasty acts. It is a relic of that false assump-
tion which formerly assigned to ldgislators a greater measure of
wisdom than was possessed by the people. Such a restriction is not
only inconvenient, but it often prevents persons from exercising their
intention. According to the Japanese Code, donation takes effect
when one of the parties expresses his intention of giving property
of his own to the other party without consideration, and the other
party accepts the gift. But a gift not expressed in writing can be
rescinded by either party, except so far as performance has already
been made.'
Sale.-The definition of sale is found in Article 555 of the Japan-
ese Code. It is there stated that a sale is effected when one, of the
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parties agrees to transfer a property right to the other party and
the latter agrees to pay him a price therefor. When the property
of another person is made the subject of a sale, the French law
expressly states that there exists no sale, but gives the purchaser
the right to demand damages if he was ignorant of the fact. The
Japanese Code has adopted the contrary principle. Article 56c
reads: "If a right of another person is made the subject of a sale,
the seller is bound to acquire such right and transfer it to the buyer."
If the effect of a sale is to transfer the ownership itself, then as a
logical consequence the sale of a thing over which the seller has
no ownership must be regarded as null and void, but by Japanese
law a sale of this kind only creates an obligation to transfer the
ownership, but does not transfer it. Therefore the sale of a right
belonging to another need not necessarily be considered as null and
void, but the intention of the parties is carried out bi compelling the
seller to obtain such a right and transfer it to the buyer.
The French and German Codes recognize the contract of repur-
chase as to movables (French Code, Article 1659; German Code,
Article 497). It is defined to be a contract by which the seller
reserves to himself the right to retake the thing sold, by restoring
the purchase money with interest, and incidental expenses incurred
by the buyer. The Japanese Code simply limits this species of con-
tract to immovables, for in respect of immovables the contract may
be registered and notice thereby given to third persons of its exist-
ence, but, no method, by which such notice can be given, exists in
regard to movables. The ownership of a movable is transferred by
mere delivery of the thing, and therefore, if the purchaser should
transfer it to a third person the original seller's right of repurchase
would not bind the new purchaser. Hence even if this contract
were recognized by law it would be impossible to secure the inforce-
ment thereof, accordingly it was omitted from the present Japanese
Code. On the subject of the sale of immovables the French law
contains a peculiar provision to the effect that the seller may rescind
the contract within two years, if the price obtained for it is found to
be so low that his loss amounts to over seven-tWelfths of the actual
value. The absurdity of such a provision need not be commented
on. In these days perfect freedom is given to sellers and buyers
to sell and buy at whatever prices they may agree upon. I need
hardly add that nothing of the kind finds a place in the Japanese
Code.
Hiring and Letting.-Hiring and letting is the locatio conductio
reron of the Roman law. It is effected when one of the parties
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agrees to allow the other party to use and take the profits of a thing,
and the other party agrees to pay rent for it. Either a movable or
an inmovable may be made the subject of hiring and letting.
Whether the right thus created should be regarded as a right in rein
or a right in personam has been the subject of conflicting opinions
among jurists. The Japanese Code treats it as a right in personam,
but in respect of immovables, if the contract is registered, it is good
against third persons (Article 605). Upon the question whether
the hirer can sublet or assign the subject of the contract, the French
Code provides that he may do so unless expressly prohibited by the
terms of the contract. The rule adopted in the Japanese Code, on
the contrary, is that a hirer may not, without the consent of the
lessor, assign his right to another person or sublet the thing hired
(Article 612). There may be special considerations which induce
the lessor to let a thing to one person, but the same considerations
would not apply to other and perhaps unknown parties. It would
be unjust to impose on the person letting, such a party without his
consent.
With respect to the hiring of services, a contract can only be
entered into for a fixed period or for a determinate work. This is
the rule of the French law. Therefore a contract of this kind for
life would be illegal. The rule is intended to prevent anything
resembling slavery. No such prohibition appears in the Japanese
Code, but the same object is attained by the provision that if the
duration of the contract of hiring is for more than five years or
for the lifetime of one of the parties, or of a third person, either
party may at any time after the expiration of five years rescind the
contract, but as to apprentices in a commercial or industrial business,
such term is ten years (Article 626). During long periods of time,
wages are apt to fluctuate and it would be contrary to public policy
and economy, that parties to a service contract should continue to
be bound by an agreement which is at variance with the times. At
the same time the liberty of people in disposing of their services by
contract should be recognized. Japanese law gives as much scope
to the freedom of contract as is compatible with public welfare.
Association.-Association, or socigtg, is defined in the French
Code to be a contract by which two or more persons agree to bring
certain things together with a view to share the profit. Profit is
therefore the object of the contract. This, however, unnecessarily
limits the usefulness of the contract. There are cases when parties
may desire to enter into this kind of contract with objects other
than gain. Accordingly, in the Japanese as well as the German
THE CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN.
Codes, nothing is said regarding the object of association, and the
contract of association is defined to be simply a contract in which
several parties agree to contribute money, or other things, and engage
in a joint undertaking.
Amicable Arrangement.-When parties agree to settle their dis-
putes by making mutual concessions, such agreements are called
amicable arrangement. Concerning the effect of this kind of con-
tract, the French law prescribes that it has the authority of a final
judgment. The logical consequence of this is that if a thing, the
ownership of which is disputed between two parties, is determined by
amicable arrangement to belong to one of them, the party thus tak-
ing the thing is deemed to have been the real owner from the begin-
ning. The ownership is not considered to be conferred on him by
the arrangement. This presumption may in some cases prove
injurious, for if the title to a thing should be attacked by a third
person, it could only be defended by opposing the rights of one of
the parties, whereas by opposing the rights of both parties the
attack might be successfully resisted. The Japanese Code does not
place amicable arrangement on the same footing as a final judgment,
but merely states that, if by an amicable arrangement, it is settled
that one of the parties possesses, or that the other party does not
possess, the right which was the subject of the dispute, and conclu-
sive proof is afterward produced that this right did not previously
belong to the party first mentioned, or that it did belong to the other
party, such right will be regarded as having, by the arrangement in
question, been either transferred to the first mentioned party, or
extinguished.
Management of business.-The term "Jimu-kwanri," or the man-
agement of business, is applied to cases where one person assumes
the management of another person's affairs without being bound or
authorized to do so. The rights and duties arising out of such
relations are considered in the French Code under the head of quasi-
contracts. In the Roman law they were treated as illegal acts. The
French law does not go so far as the Roman law, but it looks on
such a person with a suspicious eye, and if he obtains for himself
any benefit by the management, he is obliged to restore it as an
improper profit. But later legislative precedents give this relation
a distinct heading and treat it on the same footing as a contract or
other obligation. The management of another person's affairs is
now deemed to be undertaken with good intentions to protect the
interests of the principal. No harm is meant to the principal, nor is
it based on any benefit which might accrue to the manager. In a
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word there is no taint about the matter. It would not, therefore,
be reasonable to treat it as an illegal act, nor is it necessary to look
upon it with suspicion. The Japanese Code has adopted this view,
and so far as the peculiar circumstances admit, applies to it the rules
relating to agency.
Delicts, or Wrongful Acts.-Delicts, or wrongful acts, are the
"torts" of Anglo-American jurisprudence. The French law on the
subject is contained in the five articles, 1382-1386. The student
of comparative legislation is struck by the paucity of rules in the
French law relating to delicts, and the large mass of law on the
subject of "torts" in the common law system. This is not the
proper place to examine the various causes that have led to this
difference. But one characteristic of the Anglo-American people
may be mentioned which has exercised great influence in the develop-
ment of the exact and detailed principles in regard to torts. I refer
to the right loving nature or instinct of the race. The Japanese
law on the subject is comprised in sixteen articles, and the provisions
are quite comprehensive. Article 709 states that a person who inten-
tionally or negligently violates another's right is bound to make
compensation for the damage arising therefrom. The next article
prescribes that whether the case be one of injury to the person,
liberty or reputation of another, or to his rights of property, the
person who, under the provisions of the preceding article, has rend-
ered himself liable for damages, must also give compensation for
injury other than to rights of property. Regarding the liability of
minors or of persons of unsound mind or their guardians; of
employers for the wrongful acts of their employees; of persons who
employ contractors; of the possessors of animals, etc., minute pro-
visions are made. Two peculiar features, however, may be men-
tioned: First, where a person is killed by the wrongful act of
another, the right is given to the parents, to the husband or wife and
to the children of the person killed to demand compensation for
damage, even though no property right of theirs has been violated.
Second, in regard to contributory negligence of the injured person,
it is provided that if the injured person is himself in fault, the court
may take that fact into consideration in determining the measure of
damages. Thus the existence of contributory negligence is simply
made a. factor in estimating the amount of damages.
The remaining books of the Japanese Civil Code concern Family
Relations and Succession, and for reasons which have already been
explained, do not come within the scope of the present review. My
task is, therefore, completed. I fear I have not always succeeded
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in making my meaning entirely clear, and I am conscious of having
failed to present my observations in the most pleasing form; for
these and other short-comings I must crave indulgence since I have
been obliged to speak in a foreign tongue.
I have attempted to show, that while the framers of the Japanese
Code were guided in their labors by a spirit of wise and prudent
eclecticism, they were not, in any case, mere copyists, for in many
instances they introduced new legal conceptions, and in all instances
they endeavored to make the law responsive to the requirements of
the country, qualifying theory by a thoughtful regard for practical
considerations. But, in any event, if I have, in the language of
Lord Coke, been able to "move the diligent student to doubt," and
consequently to inquire what the law and the reason of the law are,
I shall deem my efforts abundantly rewarded.
Kazuo Hatoyama.
